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I would like to address where the work of Gilles
Deleuze can open up neglected issues in Romanticism.
That is to say, I would like to use Delueze to
intervene in a particular figure of Classic
Romanticism: the figure of an interior self as
constructed in poetry. As an example of this interior
structured through poetry, simply think of the mansions
in the mind created in Tintern Abbey. Notice how power
and authority moves from the church or abbey as
exterior social structure now in ruins to inside the
individual—the mind as "a mansion for all lovely
forms, Thy memory be as a dwelling-place" (Wordsworth,
Lyrical Ballads 120, ln 141-2).
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I believe Deleuze is useful in exposing how the
privileged interiority of the subject is just another
surface without depth. I am interested in using Deleuze
to "flatten" Romanticism and deflate the humanist
subject at its center. In place of the subject, I see
the physicality of bodies and effects of environmental
forces as significant agents. In a sense, Deleuze gives
us a phenomenology without the privileged interiority
of the human subject. He gives us agency extended over
a whole scene or environment. I'll explain this in the
closing of my analysis. For now, I'd like to begin by
looking at the privileged subject in Wordsworth and his
typical crafted "encounter narratives."
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Wordsworth's landscape is that of the poet's mind.
One can simply think of the Prelude as constructing
images of interiority or the growth of the poet's mind.
Time and again Wordsworth, as the poet who embraces
nature, also keeps nature at a distance. In the
Lyrical Ballads, poetry is defined as "the
spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling" that is then
"recollected in tranquility" (Lyrical Ballads
756). It is at such a tranquil distance that Wordsworth
contemplates dancing with the daffodils "when on my
couch I lie/ In vacant mood" ("I wander lonely as a
cloud" ln 19-20). So, Wordsworth has his encounter with
nature but moves next to retreat and regroup, using the
encounter as a metaphor for constructing the interior
subject. The same interest in but remove from nature
can be found in his 1812 tour guide. His guide to the
Lake District maintains a basic distinction between
observer here and objects over there. Each object is
considered abstractly by the observer. He takes the
object in and discusses its aesthetic merit; following
William Gilpin, Wordsworth includes a chapter on lakes,
rivers, and lesser bodies of water and another on
mountains, hills and valleys, and still another on
trees and other vegetation. Then, again like Gilpin,
Wordsworth mentally arranges these individual objects
together to compose a typical picturesque scene of
harmony and unity. During his tour of the Lakes, he
arrives at stations that function like military posts;
these observation "stations" serve as a strategic
points that allow the tourist to make advances upon
nature while remaining at a safe distance.
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Now, there are moments that disturb this harmony and
where another agency appears. Occasionally the poet is
actually confronted with objects or people that will
not remain beyond arm's length—such as the Leech
Gatherer of "Resolution and Independence" and the
angler in "Poems on the Naming of Places." Wordsworth
deflates the physicality of these encounters, a
physicality where he is troubled by the body of the
vagrant. He turns other humans into mirrors through
which the poet reflects upon himself and his state of
mind. At this point, it is worth noting several
characteristics of the poet's representation of
nature. 1) While the land is experienced through
a bodily walk, the representation of the space always
removes the poet from the scene. 2) Objects are
clearly demarcated and any thing or person who
threatens to impose upon the narrator gets appropriated
as an object for the poet's self-contemplation. Timothy
Morton might say, Wordsworth eats nature. He
incorporates it.
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Turning to Deleuze: how different Deleuze's
meanderings are from the Wordsworthian stroll. A
meandering walk first appears in the opening pages of
Anti-Oedipus, an early work by Deleuze and
Guattari. There the schizophrenic's motion
through space is juxtaposed to the neurotic on the
couch—think here of Wordsworth contemplating
daffodils "when on my couch I lie." There is a
shift from what is happening in the mind (very
Wordsworthian) to what is happening to bodies (more
Deleuzian). Anti-Oedipus works against the
Oedipal machinations in Freud. One of the major
twentieth-century critiques of Freud has been his
inversion of the political. For Freud, power gets
played out in the psyche rather than on the
streets:
Oedipus says to us: either you will internalize
the differential functions that rule over the
exclusive disjunctions, and thereby "resolve"
Oedipus, or you will fall into the neurotic night of
imaginary identifications. Either you will
follow the lines of the triangle [mother, father,
me]—lines that structure and differentiate the
three terms—or you will always bring one term
into play as if it were one too many in relation of
identification in the undifferentiated. But
there is Oedipus on either side. And everybody
knows what psychoanalysis means by resolving
Oedipus: internalizing it so as to better rediscover
it on the outside, in the children.
(Anti-Oedipus 79)
Deleuze and Guattari move from the interior to pure
exteriors—what they call a body without organs.
Furthermore, Anti-Oedipus takes aim at the
Symbolic of Lacan by siding with the
schizophrenic. For Lacan the schizophrenic
disavows the Oedipal and so refuses to enter the
Symbolic and thus culture; instead, for the
schizophrenic, everything that happens takes place on
the surface of the Real: "The true difference in nature
is not between the Symbolic and the Imaginary, but
between the real machinic (machinique) element,
which constitutes desiring-production, and the
structural whole of the Imaginary and the Symbolic,
which merely forms a myth and its variants" (83).
Contrasting the neurotic stuck within the Symbolic to
the schizophrenic operating on the Real serves as a
useful distinction for Romantic criticism since much of
Wordsworth's self-fashioning and a good deal of
criticism afterwards leaves the poet on the couch where
his theater of the mind can be examined. By
contrast, for the schizophrenic "Everything is a
machine. Celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in
the sky, alpine machines—all of them connected to
those of his body. The continual whirr of
machines" (2). The schizophrenic gets out into
the world. Whereas the Wordsworthian walk is designed
to reflect the inner workings of the mind and the mind
in relation to language, the schizoid stroll as
described by Deleuze and Guattari is meant to show
relations between bodies. Each body acts as an
assemblage that gets defined by how it is hooked up to
other assemblages. As Brian Massumi explains in
his introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, a brick
is used for constructing a building, but when coupled
with hand and smashed window, a brick is part of a
machine of political protest (Massumi xiii). So, an
object is not defined by an interior, a property of
identity and self-reflexivity (A = A, a brick is a
brick); rather it is defined by its difference,
by what it gets connected to and aligned
with.
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Another way of thinking of pure exteriors and
desiring machines is to ask what grounds meaning within
a language system. For the schizophrenic, both desire
and meaning leap from the personal to the outside (what
Lacan calls the Real) while leaping over the social
network which serves to normalize desire and linguistic
meaning. For everyone other than the schizophrenic,
signs and desires have meaning only as they function
within a social or cultural system and only as one is
able to assimilate one's interior "selfhood" with that
system. To use language is to work within a set
of social structures. For Deleuze and Guattari, the
schizophrenic is a challenge to the political and
linguistic systems simultaneously since he utilizes
language in unsocial and antisocial ways.
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The good metaphor and obedient literary image works
because of a social agreement based on selection.
Selection signals the culturally proper relationship
between vehicle and tenor. The well regulated metaphor
manages elements to be included and those to be
discarded in the relationship between vehicle and
tenor. Considering pure exteriority entails misplacing
these proper relations between inside the metaphor and
outside, as well as confusing what is proper within the
social system and what belongs outside it. The result
is the death of "all metaphor, all symbolism, all
signification, no less than all designation.
Metamorphosis is the contrary of metaphor. There is no
longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a
distribution of states that is part of the range of the
word. The thing and other things are no longer anything
but intensities overrun by deterritorialized sound or
words that are following their line of escape" (22).
Sound or words or even, one might add, gestures and
bodies, can lead us away from established social
configurations, away from metaphors we have forgotten
are metaphors, now inscribed as social truths. We are
lead instead to meanings and marks of signification
whose selection is based on the hybridity of the Real
and Symbolic, the desires assembled from the Real and
socially inscribed desiring.
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Because the schizophrenic is not "properly" hooked
up to the Oedipal machine of Imaginary desires and
Symbolic values, (that is, he is not within Culture) he
is free to roam outside of predictable social paths and
create new arrangements of objects:
we are all handymen: each with his little
machines. For every organ-machine, an energy-machine:
all the time, flows and interruptions. Judge Schreber
has sunbeams in his ass. A solar
anus. And rest assured that it works: Judge
Schreber feels something, produces something, and is
capable of explaining the process theoretically.
Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not
mere metaphors. (Anti-Oedipus 2-3)
Schreber's case is the first in which Freud analyzes
schizophrenia, and his case is taken up by Lacan in his
seminar where he lays down the Law of the Symbolic in
contrast to the schizophrenic's fascination or
hallucination of messages from the Real. But for
Deleuze and Guattari, Judge Schreber has created
something. Rather than shutting down production or
connecting production to the politics of Oedipal family
and the Oedipal State, Deleuze and Guattari's Shreber
has connected himself to the world in a new fashion. He
has created new couplings and assemblages in the
Real.
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Returning to the Romantics and to Wordsworth, we can
ask, how is the poet hooked up to the world? What
assemblages does his walking create that are not
subsumed within the Oedipal, within the Imaginary and
Symbolic? This means taking his strolls literally at
times. The Penrith beacons passage in The
Prelude connects the wandering boy to the landscape
in new ways; he is not the tourist invested in the
military beacon but rather he sees this world with
visionary dreariness that creates new couplings, new
assemblages with gibbet, woman and pool that surround
the beacon. New couplings frighten the narrator in "The
Discharged Soldier." Wordsworth is shocked by an
ill or sickly figure which he describes as only
half-human. The other half, the non-human half, derives
from the organs of the human body malfunctioning and
getting caught up in a relationship with the
surroundings, that is, with a nature that has agency.
For Wordsworth, it is in illness that one becomes most
aware of one's body. Such awareness prevents ethereal
flights of fancy and brings a return to the material
and even animal nature of being human. A poet bent upon
greatness through a soaring imagination has every right
to fear the implications of such bodiliness since
through the body the poet may be led astray and his
poetry may never cohere, never unify, and never satisfy
common sense and good taste. He must be disciplined to
stay "on the public way" as the Discharged Soldier poem
urges (Lyrical Ballads 277, ln 2). By finding
lodging for the wandering soldier, Wordsworth leads the
man into a path like his own, into a public way of
being. By the poem's end the narrator proclaims that
the man giving lodging is "my friend" and the soldier
"my comrade" (282, ln 150, 165). All are brought
together under the banner of filial kindness. The same
is true of many potentially disturbing Judge
Schreber-esque figures. The Leech-gatherer's strange
connections to the landscape are absolved by the
invocation of God at the end of the poem. The
Cumberland Beggar is likewise tamed by social and
religious laws. Each of these characters disturbs by
his literalness and physicality. Their nomadism, their
wanderings, are contained by a language of religion and
moral law as well as by turning the encounters into a
reflection on the poet's own interiority, identity, and
imagination which coopts and shuts down the radical
potential of these vagrants.
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My hope is that we can not stop the madness,
that is, we can open up the assemblages in Wordsworth
rather than focus on the unifying narrative that shuts
down the anti-Oedipal assemblages and the revolutionary
potential of the bodies on the road. The work of
Deleuze and Guattari opens the way for reassessing and
reassembling bodies and desires outside of social
machinery and toward what Paul Youngquist refers to as
"monstrosity": "Not only do they jam cultural machinery
that produces the norm of the proper body, but they
challenge its performative authority, inserting the
material fact of bodily difference into the circuit of
its reenactment" (xv). From a reconfiguration of
language to a revaluation of the (im)proper body, the
schizo-stroll produces something that cannot be
adequately assessed by the social subject and the
moral, religious, and even aesthetic norms of which it
is a part.
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