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I would like to address where the work of Gilles Deleuze can open
up neglected issues in Romanticism. That is to say, I would like
to use Delueze to intervene in a particular figure of Classic Romanticism:
the figure of an interior self as constructed in poetry. As an
example of this interior structured through poetry, simply think
of the mansions in the mind created in Tintern Abbey. Notice how
power and authority moves from the church or abbey as exterior
social structure now in ruins to inside the individual—the mind
as "a mansion for all lovely forms, Thy memory be as a dwelling-place" (Wordsworth, Lyrical
Ballads 120, ln 141-2).
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I believe Deleuze is useful in exposing how the privileged interiority
of the subject is just another surface without depth. I am interested
in using Deleuze to "flatten" Romanticism and deflate the humanist
subject at its center. In place of the subject, I see the physicality
of bodies and effects of environmental forces as significant agents.
In a sense, Deleuze gives us a phenomenology without the privileged
interiority of the human subject. He gives us agency extended over
a whole scene or environment. I'll explain this in the closing
of my analysis. For now, I'd like to begin by looking at the privileged
subject in Wordsworth and his typical crafted "encounter narratives."
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Wordsworth's landscape is that of the poet's mind. One can simply
think of the Prelude as constructing images of interiority or the
growth of the poet's mind. Time and again Wordsworth, as the poet
who embraces nature, also keeps nature at a distance. In the Lyrical
Ballads, poetry is defined as "the spontaneous overflow of
powerful feeling" that is then "recollected in tranquility" (Lyrical
Ballads 756). It is at such a tranquil distance that Wordsworth
contemplates dancing with the daffodils "when on my couch I lie/
In vacant mood" ("I wander lonely as a cloud" ln 19-20). So,
Wordsworth has his encounter with nature
but moves next
to retreat
and regroup, using the encounter as a metaphor for constructing
the interior subject. The same interest in but remove from nature
can be found in his 1812 tour guide. His guide to the Lake
District maintains a basic distinction between observer here and
objects over there. Each object is considered abstractly by the
observer.
He takes the object in and discusses its aesthetic merit;
following William Gilpin, Wordsworth includes a chapter on lakes,
rivers, and lesser bodies of water and another on mountains, hills
and valleys, and still another on trees and other vegetation. Then,
again like Gilpin, Wordsworth mentally arranges these individual
objects together to compose a typical picturesque scene of harmony
and unity. During his tour of the Lakes, he arrives at stations
that function like military posts; these observation "stations" serve
as a strategic points that allow the tourist to make advances upon
nature while remaining at a safe distance.
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Now, there are moments that disturb this harmony and where another
agency appears. Occasionally the poet is actually confronted with
objects or people that will not remain beyond arm's length—such
as the Leech Gatherer of "Resolution and Independence" and the
angler in "Poems on the Naming of Places." Wordsworth deflates
the physicality of these encounters, a physicality where he is
troubled by the body of the vagrant. He turns other humans into
mirrors through which the poet reflects upon himself and his state
of mind. At this point, it is worth noting several characteristics
of the poet's representation of nature. 1) While the land
is experienced through a bodily walk, the representation of the
space always removes the poet from the scene. 2) Objects
are clearly demarcated and any thing or person who threatens to
impose upon the narrator gets appropriated as an object for the
poet's self-contemplation. Timothy Morton might say, Wordsworth
eats nature. He incorporates it.
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Turning to Deleuze: how different Deleuze's meanderings are from
the Wordsworthian stroll. A meandering walk first appears
in the opening pages of Anti-Oedipus, an early work by Deleuze
and Guattari. There the schizophrenic's motion through space
is juxtaposed to the neurotic on the couch—think here of
Wordsworth contemplating daffodils "when on my couch I lie." There
is a shift from what is happening in the mind (very Wordsworthian)
to what is happening to bodies (more Deleuzian). Anti-Oedipus works
against the Oedipal machinations in Freud. One of the major
twentieth-century critiques of Freud has been his inversion of
the political. For Freud, power gets played out in the psyche
rather than on the streets:
Oedipus says to us: either you will internalize the differential
functions that rule over the exclusive disjunctions, and thereby "resolve" Oedipus,
or you will fall into the neurotic night of imaginary identifications. Either
you will follow the lines of the triangle [mother, father, me]—lines
that structure and differentiate the three terms—or you will
always bring one term into play as if it were one too many in
relation of identification in the undifferentiated. But
there is Oedipus on either side. And everybody knows what
psychoanalysis means by resolving Oedipus: internalizing
it so as to better rediscover it on the outside, in the children.
(Anti-Oedipus 79)
Deleuze and Guattari move from the interior to pure exteriors—what
they call a body without organs. Furthermore, Anti-Oedipus takes
aim at the Symbolic of Lacan by siding with the schizophrenic. For
Lacan the schizophrenic disavows the Oedipal and so refuses to
enter the Symbolic and thus culture; instead, for the schizophrenic,
everything that happens takes place on the surface of the Real: "The
true difference in nature is not between the Symbolic and the Imaginary,
but between the real machinic (machinique) element, which
constitutes desiring-production, and the structural whole of the
Imaginary and the Symbolic, which merely forms a myth and its variants" (83). Contrasting
the neurotic stuck within the Symbolic to the schizophrenic operating
on the Real serves as a useful distinction for Romantic criticism
since much of Wordsworth's self-fashioning and a good deal of criticism
afterwards leaves the poet on the couch where his theater of the
mind can be examined. By contrast, for the schizophrenic "Everything
is a machine. Celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in the
sky, alpine machines—all of them connected to those of his
body. The continual whirr of machines" (2). The schizophrenic
gets out into the world. Whereas the Wordsworthian walk is designed
to reflect the inner workings of the mind and the mind in relation
to language, the schizoid stroll as described by Deleuze and Guattari
is meant to show relations between bodies. Each body acts
as an assemblage that gets defined by how it is hooked up to other
assemblages. As Brian Massumi explains in his introduction
to A Thousand Plateaus, a brick is used for constructing
a building, but when coupled with hand and smashed window, a brick
is part of a machine of political protest (Massumi xiii). So, an
object is not defined by an interior, a property of identity and
self-reflexivity (A = A, a brick is a brick); rather it is defined
by its difference, by what it gets connected to and aligned with.
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Another way of thinking of pure exteriors and desiring machines
is to ask what grounds meaning within a language system. For the
schizophrenic, both desire and meaning leap from the personal to
the outside (what Lacan calls the Real) while leaping over the
social network which serves to normalize desire and linguistic
meaning. For everyone other than the schizophrenic, signs and desires
have meaning only as they function within a social or cultural
system and only as one is able to assimilate one's interior "selfhood" with
that system. To use language is to work within a set of social
structures. For Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic is a challenge
to the political and linguistic systems simultaneously since he
utilizes language in unsocial and antisocial ways.
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The good metaphor and obedient literary image works because of
a social agreement based on selection. Selection signals the culturally
proper relationship between vehicle and tenor. The well regulated
metaphor manages elements to be included and those to be discarded
in the relationship between vehicle and tenor. Considering pure
exteriority entails misplacing these proper relations between inside
the metaphor and outside, as well as confusing what is proper within
the social system and what belongs outside it. The result is the
death of "all metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, no less
than all designation. Metamorphosis is the contrary of metaphor.
There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only
a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word.
The thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities
overrun by deterritorialized sound or words that are following
their line of escape" (22). Sound or words or even, one might add,
gestures and bodies, can lead us away from established social configurations,
away from metaphors we have forgotten are metaphors,
now inscribed as social truths. We are lead instead to meanings
and marks of signification whose selection is based on the hybridity
of the Real and Symbolic, the desires assembled from the Real and
socially inscribed desiring.
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Because the schizophrenic is not "properly" hooked up to the Oedipal
machine of Imaginary desires and Symbolic values, (that is, he
is not within Culture) he is free to roam outside of predictable
social paths and create new arrangements of objects:
we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For
every organ-machine, an energy-machine: all the time, flows and
interruptions. Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A
solar anus. And rest assured that it works: Judge Schreber
feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining
the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects
of a machine, not mere metaphors. (Anti-Oedipus 2-3)
Schreber's case is the first in which Freud analyzes schizophrenia,
and his case is taken up by Lacan in his seminar where he lays
down the Law of the Symbolic in contrast to the schizophrenic's
fascination or hallucination of messages from the Real. But for
Deleuze and Guattari, Judge Schreber has created something. Rather
than shutting down production or connecting production to the politics
of Oedipal family and the Oedipal State, Deleuze and Guattari's
Shreber has connected himself to the world in a new fashion. He
has created new couplings and assemblages in the Real.
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Returning to the Romantics and to Wordsworth, we can ask, how
is the poet hooked up to the world? What assemblages does his walking
create that are not subsumed within the Oedipal, within
the Imaginary and Symbolic? This means taking his strolls literally
at times. The Penrith beacons passage in The Prelude connects
the wandering boy to the landscape in new ways; he is not the tourist
invested in the military beacon but rather he sees this world with
visionary dreariness that creates new couplings, new assemblages
with gibbet, woman and pool that surround the beacon. New couplings
frighten the narrator in "The Discharged Soldier." Wordsworth
is shocked by an ill or sickly figure which he describes as only
half-human. The other half, the non-human half, derives from the
organs of the human body malfunctioning and getting caught up in
a relationship with the surroundings, that is, with a nature that
has agency. For Wordsworth, it is in illness that one becomes most
aware of one's body. Such awareness prevents ethereal flights of
fancy and brings a return to the material and even animal nature
of being human. A poet bent upon greatness through a soaring imagination
has every right to fear the implications of such bodiliness since
through the body the poet may be led astray and his poetry may
never cohere, never unify, and never satisfy common sense and good
taste. He must be disciplined to stay "on the public way" as the
Discharged Soldier poem urges (Lyrical Ballads 277, ln 2).
By finding lodging for the wandering soldier, Wordsworth leads
the man into a path like his own, into a public way of being. By
the poem's end the narrator proclaims that the man giving lodging
is "my
friend" and the soldier "my comrade" (282, ln 150, 165). All are
brought together under the banner of filial kindness. The same
is true of many potentially disturbing Judge Schreber-esque figures.
The Leech-gatherer's strange connections to the landscape are absolved
by the invocation of God at the end of the poem. The Cumberland
Beggar is likewise tamed by social and religious laws. Each of
these characters disturbs by his literalness and physicality. Their
nomadism, their wanderings, are contained by a language of religion
and moral law as well as by turning the encounters into a reflection
on the poet's own interiority, identity, and imagination which
coopts and shuts down the radical potential of these vagrants.
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My hope is that we can not stop the madness, that is, we
can open up the assemblages in Wordsworth rather than focus on
the unifying narrative that shuts down the anti-Oedipal assemblages
and the revolutionary potential of the bodies on the road. The
work of Deleuze and Guattari opens the way for reassessing and
reassembling bodies and desires outside of social machinery and
toward what Paul Youngquist refers to as "monstrosity": "Not only
do they jam cultural machinery that produces the norm of the proper
body, but they challenge its performative authority, inserting
the material fact of bodily difference into the circuit of its
reenactment" (xv). From a reconfiguration of language to
a revaluation of the (im)proper body, the schizo-stroll produces
something that cannot be adequately assessed by the social subject
and the moral, religious, and even aesthetic norms of which it
is a part.
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