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Legacies of Paul de ManThinking Singularity with Immanuel Kant
and Paul de Man:
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Notes1 Rodolphe
Gasché, in his The Idea of Form: Reading Kant's
Aesthetics. Interestingly invokes the idea of the
"pre-cognitive" in context. 2 Paul de Man,
Aesthetic Ideology. (This work will thereafter be
cited as AI). 3
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment. (This
work will thereafter be cited as CJ). 4 I
translate Wohlgefallen as "feeling of liking,"
imperfectly but, I think, less inaccurately than Pluhar's
"liking." 5
Jacques Derrida's "Parergon" and "Economimesis" come to
mind as possible exceptions, but they do not strictly offer
readings of the beautiful either. 6 One
could also speak of the proto-cognitive or, along the lines
of Gasché's discussion in The Idea of Form,
of pre-cognitive processes involved in this model. The
epistemological model to be developed in this article and a
reading of Kant it implies are, however, different from
Gasché's scheme, in part by virtue of bringing Kant
and de Man together. It is peculiar that Gasché does
not discuss de Man's work, which he discusses at length in
his excellent The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul de
Man to bear on his reading of Kant. But then,
Gasché's reading of de Man, too, diverges from the
one to be offered here. Gasché, however, rightly
relates all three of Kant's Critiques through the
epistemological problematic of the third Critique,
which de Man does as well, along the lines of
(nonclassical) allegorical epistemology, as discussed
here. 7 One
can formulate a parallel proposition for the sublime,
although in the case of the sublime according to Kant there
would be no corresponding object. 8 I
refer, in particular, to his discussions in The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, and
The Differend: Phrases in Dispute although the
problematic persists throughout his work on postmodernity.
Lyotard juxtaposes Kant and Hegel in this context, in my
view, not altogether justifiably. By contrast, de Man
cogently relates Kant and Hegel along these lines, without,
however, equating them. 9 A
possibly nonclassical view of the ultimate constitution of
nature, such as that found in quantum theory, would not
change this status of the body, since it is still
thinkable, even if not knowable, in these
nonclassical terms—unless we consider the body as a
quantum system and thus make it nonclassically unthinkable
at the ultimate level. In this case, Kant's requirements
are still fulfilled at different levels of theory, insofar
as concerns the logical structure of our arguments
differently or our practical justifications for such
arguments, including specifically that for the possibility
or necessity of nonclassicality. In a different register,
de Man, via his reading of Kant, approaches the
nonclassical epistemology of the body and, interactively,
language, by dismembering or disfiguring both. For the
discussion of the nonclassical epistemology of quantum
theory, I permit myself to refer to Arkady Plotnitsky,
The Knowable and the Unknowable: Nonclassical Theory,
Modern Science, and the "Two Cultures" and, in the
context of de Man, "Algebra and Allegory: Nonclassical
Epistemology, Quantum Theory and the Work of Paul de
Man." 10
See, for example, Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious,"
General Psychological Theory: Papers on
Metapsychology and Jacques Lacan, The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. 11
The epistemology becomes classical once such exclusion
takes place. This difficulty is one of Derrida's main
concerns in "Economimesis." 12
This edition omits the first passage just cited, which is
found in Georges Bataille, "Conférences sur le
Non-Savoir." 13 On
the relationships between this type of (nonclassical)
epistemological situation and Heidegger's concept of Being
[Sein], on the one hand, and Derrida's own
epistemology, on the other, see Derrida's analysis in
Of Grammatology, and Margins of
Philosophy. 14
This concept of singularity has affinities (although is not
equivalent) to that of Gilles Deleuze, introduced by him at
the outset of Difference and Repetition and
pursued throughout his work. He contrasts the "singular,"
as that which outside law (physical, moral, or other) and,
thus, outside the general, and is subject to "repetition"
in his special sense of the term, to the "particular,"
which is part of the general and subject to law. This
scheme, including Deleuze's concept of repetition, could be
related to de Man's argument to be discussed here (also via
Hegel and, on repetition, Kierkegaard). Deleuze comes
closest to the present conception of singularity in his
analysis of a kind of phenomenology of monadological
perceptions in Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the
Baroque. 15 As
I have indicated, one can also encounter situations that
are mixed, that is, organized partly classically and partly
nonclassically, and the present analysis could be easily
adjusted to accommodate such mixed cases. 16
Under these conditions the very category of consensus
becomes problematic. Although differently from the way in
which Lyotard argues the case in his debate with
Jürgen Habermas, from this perspective, too, the
post-Enlightenment ideas and ideals of democracy and
consensus may be in conflict rather than, as Habermas wants
to argue, in accord with each other. 17 De
Man's reading of Hegel proceeds along similar lines rather
than, as is more common, strictly along the lines of a
continuous model of history. 18
For this and related or similar reasons, "event" becomes a
crucial concept in recent theoretical discussion in and
following de Man, Deleuze, and Derrida. 19
Both de Man's and Derrida's readings of, and exchanges on,
Rousseau involve these problematics as well. 20
The original passage occurs in Friedrich Schiller, On
the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of
Letters. (Translation is modified by de Man). 21
Cf. also de Man's reading of Keats's The Fall of
Hyperion in "The Resistance to Theory," The
Resistance to Theory. 22 It
is difficult to be certain given the complexities of the
concept and the very signifier of "correspondence" in de
Man. Cf. Andrzej Warminski's analysis of de Man's reading
of Baudelaire's "Correspondances" in "As Poets Do It," in
Cohen, et al, Material Events, cited earlier. It
would also be instructive to follow de Man's earlier
approach to "correspondences" of that type in "The Rhetoric
of Temporality." 23
Cf. also de Man's analysis of Nietzsche and Rousseau in
Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau,
Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust and in "The Epistemology
of Metaphor." 24
Derrida closes with this passage his analysis of the third
Critique in "Parergon" (The Truth in
Painting 147). 25
The sublime, though, is not infinite either, only almost
infinite, as Derrida notes in the same section, "The
Colossal," in "Parergon" (The Truth in Painting,
119-47). |