Notes

1. Although my account of punishment bears some similarity to that found in Talal Asad's work, I depart from his basic view that the development of secular penal apparatuses corresponds to an essentially skeptical moral philosophy (21-66).

2. On Milton's position in this tradition, see Patterson, 62-89.

3. See, for instance Price's comments on the need for "true religion" in the concept of freedom, which in turn furthers the overthrow of "priestcraft" (6,182).

4. On Romantic opposition to the death penalty, see my Shadow of Death.

5. Although my account differs from Frances Ferguson's view of Bentham's rationalism, I'm very much in agreement with her arguments in a range of writings including "Coherence and Changes."

6. For an account of the history of "imagination" in relation to political interest, see Engelmann.

7. Here my account contrasts with Jerome Christensen's view that the poem risks doubling the application of power that it denounces. But I think that this reading neglects the consistent emphasis on framings readers' perceptions within a new account of actions as guilty "combatants" (89-90).

8. The last line refutes readings of the poem that characterize Coleridge's work generally as a retreat into the family or domesticity (Ellison 119, Jones 67-105, Everest 270-80).

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